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Abstract
According to the “confrontation model,” integrated history and
philosophy of science operates like an empirical science. It tests philo-
sophical accounts of science against historical case studies much like
other sciences test theory against data. However, the confrontation
model’s critics object that historical facts can neither support gen-
eralizations nor genuinely test philosophical theories. Here I argue
that most of the model’s defects trace to its usual framing in terms
of two problematic accounts of empirical inference: the hypothetico-
deductive method and enumerative induction. This framing can be
taken to suggest an unprofitable one-off confrontation between par-
ticular historical facts and general philosophical theories. I outline
more recent accounts of empirical inquiry, which describe an iterative
back-and-forth movement between concrete (rather than particular)
empirical exemplars to their abstract (rather than general) descrip-
tions. Reframed along similar lines, the confrontation model contin-
ues to offer both conceptual insight and practical guidance for a nat-
uralized philosophy of science.
(Forthcoming in The Journal of the Philosophy of History.)
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1 Introduction
How do philosophical accounts of science relate to the history of science?
Since roughly the 1980s, many practitioners of integrated history and phi-
losophy of science (or HPS) have espoused a close analogy to the natural
sciences: They have framed HPS as an empirical science of science. On
this view, philosophers of science articulate hypotheses about science and
test them against historical case studies, much like scientists test hypothe-
ses about nature against data from observation and experiment. In an in-
sightful review of recent debates concerning the history-philosophy rela-
tionship, Jutta Schickore dubbed this the “confrontation model” of HPS.1
The confrontation model is attractive because it solves conceptual and
practical problems of the history-philosophy relationship. Consider, for
example, how the model elucidates the nature and status of philosophical
analyses of science. The positivist tradition of the mid-twentieth-century
wanted philosophy to provide autonomous normative guidance to the sci-
ences but found it difficult to make good on that ambition. The confronta-
tion model, by contrast, suggests an empirical project that is continuous
with science itself and needs no autonomous warrant. Moreover, the con-
frontation model provides practical guidance. It suggests that progress in
the philosophy of science requires us to break down our accounts into their
components parts, and to articulate each part with sufficient clarity to per-
mit empirical testing against contemporary and historical scientific prac-
tice. Proponents of the confrontation model would point to many debates
in the past decades (for example on induction, explanation, or scientific
realism) whose progress has relied on such empirical testing.
Despite its attractions, the confrontation model has faced severe crit-
icisms. For one thing, how can historical facts provide evidence for or
against philosophical theses? Many believe that historical data resists gen-
eralization, is heavily theory-laden, and lacks normative force. For another
thing, does the history of science even provide appropriate data against
which philosophers can test their theses? Historians may not be investi-
gating the details of epistemic practices, for example, that are relevant to
philosophers. Finally, is it self-defeating to link history and philosophy of
1. Jutta Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS: Another 20 Years Later,” Perspectives on Sci-
ence 19, no. 4 (2011): 453–481. Schickore’s title was a reply to Larry Laudan, “Thoughts on
HPS: 20 Years Later,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20, no. 1 (1989): 9–13.
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science as data and theory? Perhaps an empirical philosophy of science
most naturally and profitably engages not with the history of science, but
with recent science and the empirical disciplines that study recent science.
The thesis of the present article is that the confrontation model’s diffi-
culties are artifactual. The problem is not that the basic analogy between
HPS and the empirical sciences is unsound. Instead, the model’s problems
can be traced to its usual framing in terms of two influential but problem-
atic accounts of empirical inquiry: hypothetico-deductivism and enumer-
ative induction. I will argue that most objections against the model dis-
appear if we adopt an updated view of empirical inquiry that is closely
informed by recent studies of the life sciences.
Section 2 begins by outlining the attractions of the confrontation model,
while section 3 discusses the objections against it. Section 4 then reframes
the analogy between the methodology of HPS and the methodology of the
empirical sciences. Section 5 revisits the difficulties, arguing that the re-
framing of the confrontation model resolves or ameliorates them. Section 6
concludes the discussion.
2 Attractions of the confrontation model
The confrontation model emerged as a consequence of a larger shift in
philosophers’ thinking about the history-philosophy relationship. To sit-
uate the shift in conceptual space, consider a contribution by David Hull
to a symposium at the 1992 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Associa-
tion.2 He suggested a two-by-two matrix of views about the role of empir-
ical evidence in science, on the one hand, and in the study of science, on
the other. First, there was the logical empiricist tradition, dominant in mid-
twentieth-century philosophy of science, which took empirical evidence to
be crucial in science, but assumed that philosophical claims about science
must be supported by extra-empirical, a priori standards. The second posi-
tion was to believe that empirical evidence is not decisive in science itself,
but that it should have a greater role in deciding between different philo-
sophical accounts. An odd view at first glance, this was plausibly Thomas
2. David L. Hull, “Testing Philosophical Claims About Science,” PSA: Proceedings of the
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1992, 468–475.
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Kuhn’s position in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.3 Third, there were
relativists who denied that empirical evidence has a decisive role either
in science or in the study of science. And finally, there were those who
thought that empirical evidence is crucial both to science and to the study
of science. Hull committed to the fourth view:
We need to construct theories about science the way that scien-
tists construct theories about fluids, gene flow and continental
drift. To construct such theories, we need data, and our only
source of data is the study of science, past and present.4
Like Hull, many philosophers of science in the 1980s transitioned from the
first to the fourth position. I will refer to these as the “a priori” and the
“naturalistic” positions, respectively. While the details of the accounts dif-
fered, a naturalistic view of the project of the study of science came to be
widely adopted.5
Why did philosophers change their minds about the relationship be-
tween philosophical claims and empirical evidence? A large part of the an-
swer is that the a priori position was perceived to have run out of steam.
This is nicely exemplified by two contributions, twelve years apart, by
Ronald Giere.
In 1973, Giere famously asked whether the history and philosophy of
science were in an “intimate relationship” or a mere “marriage of conve-
nience.”6 At the time, he judged that proponents of the intimate relation-
ship had failed to make their case. One problem was circularity: If we wish
to use historical facts as evidence in our philosophical theorizing about sci-
ence’s empirical methods, this presupposes that we already have some no-
tion of evidence – that is, of empirical methods. This circularity suggests
that at least some empirical methods cannot be discovered empirically. An-
other problem was normativity: It was widely accepted that the aim of phi-
losophy was not just to describe science’s empirical methods, but to make
3. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press,
1962).
4. Hull, “Testing Philosophical Claims About Science,” 473.
5. On the reemergence of varieties of naturalism in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, see Philip Kitcher, “The Naturalists Return,” The Philosophical Review 101, no. 1 (1992):
53–114.
6. Ronald N. Giere, “History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Mar-
riage of Convenience?,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (1973): 282–297.
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normative judgments about their validity. It was reasonably clear how
a priori approaches could support such prescriptions. For instance, Pop-
per’s falsificationism, which claimed that inferences from particular facts
to general theories are only valid if they instantiate modus tollens, derived
its normative force from deductive logic. But the naturalistic approaches
could not rely on the authority of deductive inference. They had to provide
“a philosophical account which explains how norms are based on facts.”7
Such an account remained to be articulated, although Giere did not rule out
the possibility that one might eventually be found.
By 1985, Giere’s assessment of the situation had changed.8 He now ar-
gued that existing a priori approaches had failed. In particular, Giere iden-
tified fundamental flaws in methodological foundationism: the project of
giving a priori justifications for empirical methods. This included Carnap’s
inductive logic, Reichenbach’s “straight rule,” Popper’s falsificationism,
and variants of Bayesianism. All of these proposals faced both concep-
tual and empirical difficulties, and Giere argued that they could not re-
solve them without resorting to empirical facts. They avoided circular-
ity no more successfully than their naturalistic rivals. Giere thus judged
methodological foundationism to be “a hopeless program” that could not
justify methodological norms.9 What is more, the a priori approaches had
failed to give even remotely adequate descriptions of actual scientific rea-
soning. On balance, the naturalized approach to the philosophy of science
now seemed to offer the best prospects. Giere concluded that “the study
of science must itself be a science,” and that the “only viable philosophy of
science is a naturalized philosophy of science.”10
The naturalized approach permits a reassessment of the problems of
circularity and normativity. Abandoning the assumption that there must
be a foundational scientific method with a priori warrant, naturalism ex-
pects that the justification of empirical claims will rely on further empirical
claims. Nevertheless, the problem of circularity is defanged, since the justi-
fying claims, although empirical, are different in content from the justified
claims. As Giere put it succinctly some decades later, “inquiry always be-
7. Giere, “Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?,” 290.
8. Ronald N. Giere, “Philosophy of Science Naturalized,” Philosophy of Science 52, no. 3
(1985): 331–356.
9. Ibid., 336.
10. Ibid., 355.
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gins with the beliefs one has,” and “anything can be questioned, but not
everything at once.”11 The naturalized approach transforms the problem
of scientific knowledge. The task is no longer to give a foundational jus-
tification for scientific methods. Instead, the demand is for a scientific ex-
planation. How are organisms with roughly our biological makeup, pos-
sessing roughly our capacities for perception and cognition, and living in
roughly the environment we find ourselves in, capable of learning about
the detailed structure of the world?
Despite the turn away from the a priori tradition, naturalistic philoso-
phers tried to recover a lean notion of goal-relative normativity.12 Physics
is indisputably an empirical discipline, but it does tell us what we “should”
do in order to achieve particular purposes such as sending probes to distant
planets. The philosophy of science can similarly investigate which proce-
dures promote desired goals.13 In this spirit, Hull even suggested that we
test proposed norms experimentally by convincing groups of scientists to
adopt them:
If science in such areas immediately grinds to a halt, then pos-
sibly something is wrong with one’s normative claims. Con-
versely, if those scientists who adopt your views are even more
successful in attaining their epistemic goals, then possibly there
is something to be said for these norms.14
Naturalists must argue that it is cogent to test empirical methods empiri-
cally.15
The confrontation model is a corollary to the shift to naturalism. If
philosophical accounts of science have the same status as scientific theo-
ries, then they must be submitted to similarly stringent empirical tests. The
most ambitious and best-known effort in that direction was the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute (VPI) project on scientific change. Under the direction
11. Ronald N. Giere, “History and Philosophy of Science: Thirty-Five Years Later,” in Inte-
grating History and Philosophy of Science, ed. Seymour Mauskopf and Tad Schmaltz (Springer,
2011), 61.
12. Ibid.
13. Larry Laudan, “Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1987): 19–31.
14. Hull, “Testing Philosophical Claims About Science,” 474.
15. Peter Lipton and John Worrall, “Tracking Track Records,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volumes 74 (2000): 179–235. See also Kitcher, “The Naturalists Re-
turn.”
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of Larry Laudan, Rachel Laudan and Arthur Donovan, the project’s goal
was to articulate influential “post-positivist” accounts of scientific change –
by such authors as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan himself – in terms of histor-
ically testable theses.16 Providing empirical support for these models was
seen in direct contrast to the “logical or philosophical ideals of epistemic
warrant” that an earlier generation of philosophers had insisted upon.17
But so far, few assertions about the nature and dynamics of science were
well-founded by naturalistic standards. The post-positivist models of sci-
entific change had received only “perfunctory and superficial” testing and
had met “[n]othing resembling the standards of testing that these very au-
thors insist upon within science.”18 It was time to go beyond “[s]loganeer-
ing on behalf of naturalism in epistemology” and to address the “particu-
larities of the testing process itself.”19
To the best of my knowledge, no one ever produced a handbook on nat-
uralistic theory testing in philosophy that discussed those particularities of
the testing process in depth. However, among the steps that the VPI group
took in order to render models of scientific change testable, two in par-
ticular stand out. First, the models needed to be teased apart into separate
claims that could be assessed individually, since all models were likely false
if judged in their entirety. In a field marked by competing big pictures, this
promised progress by modularization. Second, claims needed to be made
empirically tractable. They needed to be operationalized so that empirical
data could support or rebut them. Hull even argued compellingly that the
only way to fully articulate the content of many philosophical theses about
science is to operationalize them.20
16. Larry Laudan et al., “Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Re-
search,” Synthese 69, no. 2 (1986): 141–223, and Arthur Donovan, Larry Laudan, and Rachel
Laudan, eds., Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1988). For a recent reflection on the project by two main authors, see Larry
Laudan and Rachel Laudan, “The Re-Emergence of Hyphenated History-and-Philosophy-
of-Science and the Testing of Theories of Scientific Change,” Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part A 59 (2016): 74–77.
17. Laudan et al., “Scientific Change,” 142.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 143.
20. David Hull, “Studying the Study of Science Scientifically,” Perspectives on Science 6, no.
3 (1998): 209–231.
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3 Objections to the confrontation model
In her recent survey of debates about HPS, Schickore questioned whether
the analogy between the empirical sciences and HPS is appropriate and
useful.21 In her view, the difficulties of the confrontation model are over-
whelming, and practitioners of HPS would do better to understand them-
selves as part of a hermeneutic tradition.
The first two worries, and in my view the most important, concern the
way in which historical episodes can be expected to speak for or against
philosophical theses. One problem is summarized by what Joseph Pitt has
called the “dilemma of case studies.” His abstract is a concise thesis state-
ment:
What do appeals to case studies accomplish? Consider the di-
lemma: On the one hand, if the case is selected because it ex-
emplifies the philosophical point, then it is not clear that the
historical data hasn’t been manipulated to fit the point. On the
other hand, if one starts with a case study, it is not clear where
to go from there – for it is unreasonable to generalize from one
case or even two or three.22
The dilemma’s two horns are the following. If we work “top-down,” we
begin with a general philosophical hypothesis and look for particular his-
torical cases to test it. But then how do we know that we are not imposing
a preconceived philosophical view on the evidence, either by selecting con-
venient cases or by distorting inconvenient ones? We are no better off if we
reason “bottom-up,” beginning with particular historical cases and trying
to derive general philosophical hypotheses from them. For then we are im-
mediately confronted with a basic difficulty of induction: How many cases
are sufficient warrant for a general claim?
Another problem is that historical data is suspected to be theory-laden
and cannot unproblematically serve to test philosophical theories. If the
historical data is itself shaped by philosophical assumptions, then using
it to test philosophical theories may be viciously circular. According to
Schickore, the debates about theory-ladenness were never brought to a con-
21. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS.”
22. Joseph C. Pitt, “The Dilemma of Case Studies: Toward a Heraclitian Philosophy of
Science,” Perspectives on Science 9, no. 4 (2001): 373.
8
clusion.23 For many there remain serious doubts about whether historical
data is sufficiently independent to adjudicate philosophical debates.24
The third problem is that the history of science may simply not provide
the kind of data that philosophers require. Schickore considered recent
winners of the Pfizer Award of the History of Science Society. These works
reveal the concern of present-day historians of science with visual represen-
tations; with the role and influence of nominally non-scientific actors (from
gardeners to midwives and engineers) on the history of science; or with the
role of commerce in scientific exchanges in the early modern period.25 But
they do not obviously speak to the concerns of philosophers.
Fourth, Schickore argued that a naturalistic construal of the history-
philosophy relationship may be self-defeating.26 If philosophical claims are
to be tested by confrontation with an empirical basis, why should that
basis be the history of science? Giere had already suggested that disci-
plines studying contemporary science – sociology, cognitive science, and so
on – may provide a more appropriate and richer empirical basis for testing
philosophical claims about science.
Given the cumulative force of these difficulties, two options present
themselves. One is to question the viability of HPS as a metascientific
project. The other is to identify the source of the difficulties and to reframe
the HPS project in more productive terms. This is what Schickore chose to
do:
The problem is the confrontation model, which portrays philo-
sophical analysis as akin to the practice of natural science, as a
practice of constructing a general theory, producing data, and
confronting the theory with the data. This portrayal misrepre-
sents the nature of analyses of science.27
She argued that one could not simply work bottom-up by generalizing
from the phenomena “because one will need some preliminary concepts to
23. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 467.
24. For recent discussions, see Katherina Kinzel, “Narrative and Evidence. How Can Case
Studies from the History of Science Support Claims in the Philosophy of Science?,” Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49 (2015): 48–57; Katherina Kinzel, “Pluralism in
Historiography: A Case Study of Case Studies,” in The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies,
ed. Tilman Sauer and Raphael Scholl (Springer, 2016), 123–149.
25. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 465–6.
26. Ibid., 470.
27. Ibid., 471.
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examine the historical record.”28 Nor could one reason top-down by testing
preconceived philosophical accounts, since “the examination of the histor-
ical record will affect the initial analytic tools.”29
Schickore instead suggested a hermeneutic conception of HPS.30 It rec-
ognizes that “philosophical and indeed any analyses of science can only
be obtained through acts of interpretation,” and that “the initial interpre-
tive categories are necessarily provisional.”31 Our conception of HPS must
reflect that the student of science moves in an interpretive circle:
Initial case judgments – judgments that identify portions of the
historical record as noteworthy – and provisional analytic con-
cepts are gradually reconciled until they are brought into equi-
librium. To characterize this metascientific endeavor in terms of
“case studies” that are “confronted” with “general philosophi-
cal accounts” is misleading.32
Thus, HPS is an iterative activity that seeks an equilibrium between philo-
sophical concepts and interpretations of historical cases. It is far removed
from the notion of a decisive one-off confrontation between theory and
data. Schickore thus concluded that HPS should not be construed as a sci-
ence of science.
In the next two sections, I will take a different tack. I grant many
of the criticisms that Schickore cites, but I believe that she has misdiag-
nosed the problem. The analogy between science and the philosophy of
science is sound. The problem is that we have framed the confrontation
model in terms of two inadequate accounts of empirical inquiry in the nat-
ural sciences. Most of the model’s difficulties can be traced to this fram-
ing, including the notion of decisive one-off confrontations. If we update
our account of empirical inquiry, then the objections to the confrontation
model largely dissolve. This allows us to improve our understanding of
the history-philosophy relationship while also retaining the many virtues
of a naturalized philosophy of science.
28. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 472.
29. Ibid.
30. C. Mantzavinos, “Hermeneutics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter
2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016).
31. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 461.
32. Ibid., 471.
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4 Reframing the confrontation model
The confrontation model’s usual framing relies explicitly or implicitly on
two accounts of empirical inquiry: hypothetico-deductivism and enumer-
ative induction. The model thus inherits the defects of these accounts, and
this motivates Pitt’s dilemma of case studies.33
One horn of the dilemma assumes that we work top-down from general
philosophical accounts to particular cases. But then the dangers are anal-
ogous to some worries about hypothetico-deductive theory-testing. The
sample by which we test our theory may be incomplete or biased. Our test-
ing of the hypothesis that “all swans are white” will be misleading if, by
happenstance or ill will, the sample against which we test the hypothesis
does not contain those swans that are black. The other horn of the dilemma
assumes that we work bottom-up from particular cases to general philo-
sophical accounts. The dangers are then analogous to those of enumerative
induction: No matter how many observations of white swans there are in
our premises, the conclusion that all swans are white is not guaranteed.
In philosophical debates of the 20th century, enumerative induction
mainly served a didactic purpose. It represented an implausible, narrow
conception of induction. This was then contrasted with the more power-
ful hypothetico-deductive account.34 However, scholarship over the past
decades suggests that, in many cases, neither model is a good description
of actual empirical inquiry.
In particular, recent work in the philosophy of biology suggests that bi-
ological practice rarely involves the framing of general hypotheses which
are then tested by their particular deductive consequences. Instead, the
focus is on elucidating mechanisms: detecting and isolating their compo-
nents, determining how the components interact, and understanding how
components and interactions are organized to produce a range of phenom-
ena.35 We will see that the mechanistic accounts of empirical inquiry bring
33. A summary of the strengths and weaknesses of different accounts of induction is given
by John D. Norton, “A Little Survey of Induction,” in Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theo-
ries & Applications, ed. Peter Achinstein (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 2005).
34. See for instance Chapter 2 in Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Prentice
Hall, 1966).
35. William Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson, Discovering Complexity: Decomposition
and Localization as Scientific Research Strategies (Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter
Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver, “Thinking About Mechanisms,” Philosophy
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different conceptual issues to the fore than the traditional models.
To be sure, there are vast differences between mechanistic research in
biology, on the one hand, and HPS, on the other. Nevertheless, I will ar-
gue that some conceptual insights about the character of empirical inquiry
are transferable between the two. Three caveats, however, are in order.
First, there is no need for present purposes to commit to any of the de-
tails of the various accounts of biological mechanisms, or to decide how
widely they apply to biology (let alone to other disciplines). These issues
remain controversial in the literature. What matters is that even the broad
outline of empirical reasoning that these accounts offer is quite different
from the models of inquiry that discussions of the history-philosophy rela-
tionship usually presuppose. Second, my claim is not that the comparison
to biology is uniquely insightful. While empirical inquiry in biology has
been particularly thoroughly studied and provides us with the resources
we need for reframing the confrontation model, a close look at other em-
pirical disciplines may reveal similar procedures. Third, I am not arguing
that hypothetico-deductivism is altogether outdated. Especially in its more
recent articulation as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), hypothetico-
deductivism remains a widespread proposal in scientific epistemology. The
claim here is only that some empirical inquiry is best understood in different
terms.36
Let us turn to a description of mechanistic inquiry in biology. In the
terminology of Bechtel and Abrahamsen, mechanistic research often pro-
ceeds from the study of “prototypes” or “exemplars.”37 In the biological
context, these are called model organisms. For instance, the mechanisms
of neural transmission were extensively studied using the giant axon of
the squid, since its size was amenable to study by the available instru-
ments and techniques. Oxidative phosphorylation was studied using mi-
tochondria from the hearts of cows, since this is an easily obtainable tissue
of Science 67, no. 1 (2000): 1–25; William Bechtel, Discovering Cell Mechanisms: The Creation
of Modern Cell Biology (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lindley Darden, Reasoning in Bi-
ological Discoveries: Essays on Mechanisms, Interfield Relations, and Anomaly Resolution (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006); Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden, In Search of Mechanisms:
Discoveries Across the Life Sciences (University of Chicago Press, 2013).
36. The case against the centrality of IBE in biological inquiry is made in Aaron Novick
and Raphael Scholl, “Presume It Not: True Causes in the Search for the Basis of Heredity,”
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.
37. William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative,”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36, no. 2 (2005): 438.
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with abundant mitochondria. The goal of such research is not to articu-
late the kinds of laws, understood as universally valid statements, that the
hypothetico-deductive model sets out to test. Instead, the investigation of
a mechanism requires techniques and procedures for detecting, isolating,
and manipulating mechanism components in order to determine their in-
teractions and their organization. Bechtel and Richardson referred to this
as the structural and functional “decomposition” of a mechanism.38 Struc-
tural and functional decomposition can proceed in any order, but usually
they will happen in parallel: as we identify parts, we can also test what
operations they perform. When an operation is mapped to a part, Bechtel
and Richardson call this “localization.” Decomposition and localization re-
sult in a description of a mechanism in the particular organism and context
under study.
Eventually scientists wish to assess the generality of their findings. On
traditional accounts, generalization is “automatic,” to quote Bechtel and
Abrahamsen.39 If we take a general law to be supported by the available
evidence, then it automatically applies to all cases in which specified an-
tecedent conditions are satisfied. By contrast, the mechanistic approach
aims for a different kind of generality. It consists in examining whether and
to what extent the mechanisms described in one case operate in a range of
further cases:
The challenge for understanding generalization is that a mech-
anistic account is highly particularized: researchers develop it
for a model organism and study mechanisms in model organ-
isms, and it is anticipated that there will be important differ-
ences – involving parts, operations, and organization – between
already-studied organisms and those to which a scientist wishes
to generalize a mechanistic explanation.40
To capture this type of generalization, the notion of a mechanism schema
is useful. Mechanism schemas are “abstract descriptions of a mechanism
with placeholders that can be filled in with known entities and activities.”41
38. Bechtel and Richardson, Discovering Complexity.
39. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative,” 437.
40. William Bechtel, “Generalization and Discovery by Assuming Conserved Mecha-
nisms: Cross-Species Research on Circadian Oscillators,” Philosophy of Science 76, no. 5
(2009): 763.
41. Craver and Darden, In Search of Mechanisms, 7.
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When scientists examine the generality of a mechanism, they investigate
whether a particular abstract mechanism schema is widely instantiated by
concrete organisms. Craver and Darden have referred to this as a schema’s
“scope.”42 The mark of generality of a biological mechanism is that its
schema has broad scope. Its generality increases with the number of further
instances of the mechanism schema in other members of the same species,
in closely related species, and sometimes even in distantly related ones.
The partial view of empirical inquiry that I have outlined can be sum-
marized in terms of three operations. The first operation is to study an
exemplar or a set of exemplars in order to describe concrete mechanisms.
The second operation is to articulate an abstract description of these mech-
anisms, the mechanism schema. The third operation is to examine the ab-
stract description’s scope: how widely it applies to other cases. The fact
that we have already developed the account in one concrete case will be
a great heuristic help in checking whether, and to what extent, it can be
transferred to others. These operations are recurrent steps in an iterative
process.
The three operations do not constitute a conceptual or temporal succes-
sion. This is important in particular for the first and second operations,
since any concrete description will always require certain abstract cate-
gories that precede it. If we have no abstract notion of what a “cell” is,
then we cannot describe anything as a cell. Moreover, it will sometimes –
perhaps commonly – happen that the phenomenon we initially took to be
significant is not the same phenomenon that we will end up explaining.
For instance, as the mechanism of gene expression was elucidated between
the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, scientists repeatedly re-
vised their notion of what was expressed. Mendel and Morgan thought of
genes in terms of the expression of traits; Beadle and Tatum took genes
to express enzymes; by the time of Jacob and Monod, genes were taken
to express both regulatory and structural proteins. Bechtel and Richardson
wrote of “reconstituting the phenomena” to capture this aspect of empirical
inquiry.43
Notice that two different pairs of antonyms appear in the preceding
paragraphs. In the traditional accounts, we test “general” hypotheses against
42. Craver and Darden, In Search of Mechanisms, 35.
43. Bechtel and Richardson, Discovering Complexity, Ch. 8.
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“particular” facts. In the revised account, the movement is from “concrete”
instances to “abstract” descriptions. The former invites problems that the
latter avoids. In the traditional framing in terms of the particular and the
general, the crucial inferences are taken to be ampliative in the sense that the
content of the general conclusion of our inference goes beyond the content
of its particular premises. Observations of a limited set of entities (“a hun-
dred ravens were black”) are taken to support claims about all such entities
(“all ravens are black”). The traditional debates about models of induction
are concerned with understanding how this amplification of content can
be justified. By contrast, the transition from the concrete to the abstract
brackets the problem of ampliative inference. In articulating an abstract
description and examining whether it applies to further concrete instances,
we are not amplifying the content of our observational premises. We are
merely charting the range of applicability of an abstract description.
This is not to say that ampliative inferences are irrelevant in biology.
For instance, biological models make assertions about the causal relation-
ships between mechanism components under specified conditions. To the
extent that this is supposed to apply to similarly situated components that
have not yet been studied, the claim is ampliative. Whether it is warranted
will depend on the applicability of the assumptions underlying the rele-
vant causal inferences and extrapolations. Similarly, biologists routinely
assume that the mechanisms discovered in one organism operate in com-
parable ways (although perhaps not identically) in closely related organ-
isms. This can also be construed as an ampliative inference, one whose
reliability depends on the relevant assumptions about phylogenetic relat-
edness and evolutionary conservation. Certainly we must closely examine
the nature and warrant of such ampliative inferences.44 However, the issue
of ampliative inference is largely orthogonal to routine empirical inquiry in
the framework of the three-operation model.
I submit that the three-operation model of empirical inquiry is also ap-
plicable to the study of science. Just like biologists, historians and philoso-
phers of science often proceed from exemplars in the history of science.
These are usually called case studies. They then move between concrete
44. My view is that these kinds of ampliative inferences rely on material postulates in the
sense of John D. Norton, “A Material Theory of Induction,” Philosophy of Science 70, no. 4
(2003): 647–670.
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and abstract descriptions of aspects of the cases, rather than between par-
ticular claims and general theses.45 The aim is to provide abstract models
of salient scientific practices. Topics will include traditional philosophical
interests like induction, experiment, and explanation, but also more recent
philosophical interests like consensus formation, diagrammatic practices,
or as yet uncharted areas. Much of this work will be concerned with de-
veloping accurate concrete descriptions of the exemplars. These will then
inform the articulation of corresponding abstract models. When we have
succeeded in articulating such abstract models, the next step is not to con-
clude that a model that worked in one case (or two or three cases) is gen-
erally applicable. The model is merely a tool we have at our disposal for
elucidating further concrete episodes. It will ideally lead to the discovery
of both similarities and differences to the cases already studied. Such re-
newed “confrontations” will allow us to improve our abstract models by
refining, adding, or removing components.46 Although generalization re-
mains a goal, it consists in the examination of the empirical scope of our
abstract descriptions: How broad is the range of further concrete cases to
which the same descriptions apply? This process does not consist in a one-
off confrontation between theory and data. It is iterative and will frequently
require us to reconstitute the phenomena as we proceed. Explanans and ex-
planandum will evolve together over time.
5 Revisiting the objections
It is time to revisit the objections discussed in Section 3 in light of the re-
framed confrontation model outlined in Section 4.
5.1 The dilemma of case studies
The three-operation model of empirical inquiry mitigates or even dissolves
Pitt’s dilemma of case studies, and it is worth discussing in detail how it
45. That empirical inquiry in HPS moves between the concrete and the abstract, rather
than between the particular to the general, was suggested to me by Hasok Chang, “Beyond
Case-Studies: History as Philosophy,” in Integrating History and Philosophy of Science, ed.
Seymour Mauskopf and Tad Schmaltz (Springer, 2011), 109–124.
46. The dynamics of the piecemeal improvement of philosophical accounts of science are
examined in Raphael Scholl and Tim Räz, “Towards a Methodology for Integrated History
and Philosophy of Science,” in The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies, ed. Tilman Sauer and
Raphael Scholl (Springer, 2016), 69–91.
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does so.47
First, no part of the three-operation model involves enumerative induc-
tion. Let us say we begin by giving a description of one or more concrete
cases of scientific explanation. We may, for instance, report that scientists
explain the phenomenon of RNA splicing by describing how it is achieved
by the so-called spliceosome: a dynamical complex of small nuclear RNAs
and proteins that assemble on pre-mRNA and, by a complicated sequence
of interactions, remove intronic sequences. So far, this concrete description
involves no enumerative induction. Second, we will describe this type of
scientific explanation more abstractly as “mechanistic,” since these scien-
tists explain the phenomenon of interest by describing the system’s parts,
their interactions, and their organization. In giving such an abstract de-
scription of a type of explanation, there is again no enumerative induction
involved. We are merely reformulating our previous concrete description
(“the U2 snRNP base-pairs to the branch point on the pre-mRNA”) with
placeholders instead of specific detail (“the parts P and Q interact by a
known activity R”). There is no claim here, for example, that scientific ex-
planations are mechanistic “in general” – say, regardless of historical period
or scientific discipline. This question only comes into focus with the third
operation, when we ask about the scope of our abstract description. Do
other concrete explanations also fit the abstract description of a mechanis-
tic explanation? If so, in what time periods are these prominent, in which
sciences, and in which circumstances? On the answers to these questions
will depend our judgment of the relative significance of mechanistic expla-
nations. Notice again, however, that there is still no enumerative induction
involved. Enumeration, yes: We study how many other cases fit a given
abstract description. But no induction in the sense of ampliative inference:
We do not conclude that the abstract description is “general,” except in so
far as it has, as an empirical matter, a broad range of known instances.
Second, the three-operation model does not share the defects of the
hypothetico-deductive model. Consider the danger of selection bias. If
one’s hypothesis about scientific explanation were that all explanations are
mechanistic, then it would be easy to create spurious support for the posi-
47. See also Richard M. Burian, “The Dilemma of Case Studies Resolved: The Virtues of
Using Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science,” Perspectives on Science 9, no.
4 (2001): 383–404.
17
tion by proffering cases that fit the mechanistic model well, while ignoring
or explaining away other, less favorable cases. However, on the three-op-
eration model we do not use historical evidence in this way. Concrete de-
scriptions (obtained in operation one) are used only to derive abstract de-
scriptions (operation two) and to determine the empirical scope of those ab-
stract descriptions (operation three). The model never advises us to lever-
age individual concrete descriptions, or even a handful of them, in order
to infer the generality of a philosophical thesis. We would have to provide
additional warrant for such an extrapolation.
One upshot of the three-operation model is that the distinction between
working top-down or bottom-up is somewhat beside the point in HPS. It
does not matter much whether we begin by studying individual cases or
by articulating abstract conceptions. The elements of the three-operation
model need not be approached in a preset order. Sometimes the cases will
suggest abstract conceptions to us which we will then elaborate. At other
times, we will begin with certain preconceived abstract descriptions and
see whether they fit a range of historical cases. Both approaches serve the
same iterative process of aligning our abstract models with concrete histor-
ical episodes. Thus, the kind of gradual reconciliation of concepts and phe-
nomena that Schickore took to be a hallmark of an interpretive, hermeneu-
tic methodology is also a feature of the updated confrontation model.48
As in the case of biology, the claim here is not that ampliative infer-
ences are wholly irrelevant to inquiry in HPS. For example, practitioners of
HPS will often assume that what they learned about scientific practice in
one case study is likely to apply to other cases. However, these are not in-
stances of simple enumerative induction, or of testing hypotheses by their
deductive consequences. Such extrapolations rely instead on the assump-
tion that the cases in question are appropriately related. This is similar to
extrapolations from model to target organisms in biology, which rely on
facts about shared ancestry. In HPS, extrapolations are sometimes war-
ranted by the fact that scientific practices in different cases are comparably
related, albeit by different processes: by teaching and imitation. Few scien-
tists invent their experimental, explanatory, or other practices de novo. So
48. See also C. Mantzavinos, “Text Interpretation as a Scientific Activity,” Journal for Gen-
eral Philosophy of Science 45, no. 1 (2014): 45–58. Mantzavinos argues that interpretive,
hermeneutic methodology and scientific methodology are more alike than is commonly
appreciated.
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it makes sense to extrapolate findings, cautiously, within recognizable sci-
entific traditions.49 Importantly, however, such ampliative inferences often
serve only as heuristics that guide the subsequent investigation of further
cases. The expectation is that both similarities and dissimilarities to previ-
ously studied cases will be found.50
5.2 The theory-ladenness of historical data
Even if the problems of unwarranted generalization and of selection bias
can be avoided, we must still worry about other ways in which we impose
philosophical concepts on historical case studies. A prominent danger is
the theory-ladenness of historical data: If we already have in mind some
particular philosophical notions about science, does this not shape what
we take to be the historical “data”?51 Many cases may turn out to look as
if they were instances of our philosophical concepts simply because that is
how we articulated them in the first place. The worry, in brief, is a tradi-
tional concern about inductive methods: that theory and data may not be
independent of each other.
Sometimes this worry is equated with the problem of selection bias.
Laudan and co-authors, for example, discuss the theory-ladenness of his-
torical data as the worry that “the historians or scientists who might con-
struct the relevant case studies are not ‘neutral’ parties, but will themselves
bring certain prior theoretical assumptions of their own to the selection of
data for inclusion in the analysis.”52 If this is all that the theory-ladenness
of historical data amounts to, then the problem collapses with the problem
of selection bias discussed in Section 5.1. The appropriate response is to
stress that our inquiries do not, in fact, leverage particular facts to support
general theses, contrary to traditional models of ampliative inference.
A more insidious version of the problem goes beyond selection bias, but
its precise nature is difficult to articulate. The general fear is that the cate-
gories we hold while reading and writing history will make our narratives
49. The thesis that extrapolation in HPS relies on assumptions about the “phylogeny” of
scientific practices is developed in Raphael Scholl and Samuel Schindler, “Justifying the
Method of Historical Case Studies: A Phylogenetic Approach,” manuscript in preparation.
50. This point was stressed for the case of generalization in biology by Bechtel, “General-
ization and Discovery by Assuming Conserved Mechanisms.”
51. Kinzel, “Narrative and Evidence”; Kinzel, “Pluralism in Historiography.”
52. Laudan et al., “Scientific Change,” 158, emphasis added.
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come out in a certain way, even though other narratives could have been
told just as well, had we made different explicit or implicit prior commit-
ments. If different authors allow their narratives to be shaped by different
views of what it means to “observe” or to “detect” or to “experiment” or
to “explain,” then we will wind up with different historical bases against
which to test theories about these practices. Robert J. Richards put this con-
cern well:
[If] observations are permeated by theory, then the empirical
world becomes rather like silly putty in the hands of a dexterous
philosopher.53
What is worse, this type of theory-ladenness may be difficult to detect. We
may be able to guard against selection bias or cherry-picking by adopting
methodological safeguards – for instance, by articulating clearly the crite-
ria by which historical cases are selected.54 But the deeper permeation of
historical data by philosophical concepts may be intractable because we
cannot write history without taking some perspective.
Exponents of the confrontation model offer two main arguments to de-
fuse the problem of theory-ladenness. The first is an argument from sym-
metry. Laudan and co-authors wrote that the problem is “a risk in all forms
of empirical research” which “seems no higher here than elsewhere.”55 If
the philosophy of science cannot be an empirical project because of theory-
ladenness, then neither can particle physics or biochemistry. But few of the
participants in this debate would deny the successes of the natural sciences
themselves.
The second argument points to our apparent success in overcoming
theory-ladenness. For example, David Hull argued that T. H. Morgan’s
seminal research in genetics was a piecemeal refutation of almost every
belief that Morgan initially held. Similarly, Popperian philosophers of sci-
ence uncovered empirical difficulties of their views even though they were
deeply committed to them. Hull concluded optimistically:
53. Robert J. Richards, “Arguments in a Sartorial Mode, or the Asymmetries of History
and Philosophy of Science,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Sci-
ence Association, 1992, 484.
54. For a proposal of this kind, see Scholl and Räz, “Towards a Methodology for Integrated
History and Philosophy of Science,” Section 4.
55. Laudan et al., “Scientific Change,” 158.
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If our meta-level paradigms were so powerful that no obser-
vation couched in them could possibly refute them, then we
would be in real trouble, but as in the case of science, students
of science come up with observations about science that do not
fit neatly into their own belief systems.56
In brief, we need to adopt some perspective to write history, but that per-
spective need not trap us. We can continue to improve our framework as
conceptual and empirical difficulties present themselves.57 Of course it is
not guaranteed that the revision of competing accounts will lead to their
convergence.58
Schickore suggested that although theory-ladenness is a fundamental
obstacle for the confrontation model, her hermeneutic approach has the
resources at least to mitigate the problem. Hermeneutics is “a procedure
through which preliminary concepts and points of view and initial case
judgments are brought together and modified and adjusted until a cogent
account is obtained.”59 Such a process of equilibration gradually adjusts
both our concepts and our historical accounts until we reach a reflective
equilibrium. In her view, the “notion of theory-ladenness of historical data
points to this very procedure but does not adequately capture the dynamic
of the process.”60
I concur with Schickore’s diagnosis. We can only accommodate theory-
ladenness if we give up the notion of a one-off confrontation between the-
ory and data. However, the discussion in Section 4 has shown that scien-
tific theory testing itself is far from a one-off process. On many current
accounts, ordinary empirical inquiry is iterative. This is part of what Bech-
tel and Richardson tried to capture with their notion of “reconstituting the
56. Hull, “Testing Philosophical Claims About Science,” 472.
57. This conclusion finds support in one of the main sources of present-day concerns
about theory-ladenness: Thomas Kuhn’s Structure. At the very heart of Kuhnian philoso-
phy is the claim that paradigms enable their own rejection. Only when a paradigm has been
worked out in precise detail can we begin to detect the conceptual and empirical anomalies
that will lead to its demise. Kuhn wrote that “[a]nomaly appears only against the back-
ground provided by the paradigm” (see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Ch. 6).
On this view, theory-ladenness is a feature, not a bug.
58. For a counterpoint to Hull’s optimism, see for example Kinzel, “Narrative and Evi-
dence,” 53–55. Kinzel suggested that neutral, theory-free criteria for assessing competing
accounts of an episode are usually too weak to settle serious disputes, while stronger crite-
ria are themselves theory-laden and therefore non-neutral.
59. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 472.
60. Ibid.
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phenomena.” As our empirical inquiry progresses, not only our explanans
but also our explanandum may change.
However, even the hypothetico-deductive model was usually seen in
terms of an iterative procedure.61 Accordingly, those who adapted that
model for the study of science did not envision a singular confrontation
between philosophical theory and historical data. It is true that the authors
of the VPI project sometimes took singular confrontations to be significant,
arguing that “[m]any of the theorists’ claims are couched as universals and,
hence, even single case-studies [. . . ] can bear decisively on them.”62 But
they also took iterativity to be important, in particular in cases of theory-
ladenness.
For example, Laudan and co-authors wrote that they “would be the last
to deny that historical research is ‘theory-laden’,”63 but insisted that the
problem could be managed:
The conclusions to draw from the difficulties of testing are that
tests must be constructed as carefully as possible, not that they
should not be undertaken, and that sustained empirical tests
will be needed, not just one all-or-nothing crucial test.64
The call for sustained empirical tests instead of one all-or-nothing crucial
test clearly envisions an iterative procedure. Thus, Laudan and co-authors
explicitly appealed to iteration as a solution to the problem of theory-laden-
ness (among others). Similarly, Hull did not suggest that theory-ladenness
in empirical science is overcome in one go. Morgan, for example, “reported
no conversion experience as he abandoned one paradigm for another.” In-
stead, “he painfully modified one belief after another as the experiments
that he and his students ran forced him to.”65
It appears that most authors in this debate agree. All acknowledge
the problem of theory-ladenness, and all take iterativity to be its proper
remedy. In order to “weaponize” the quite general problem of theory-
ladenness against the confrontation model in particular, we must frame
empirical inquiry in terms of a singular confrontation between theory and
61. See for instance Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, Chapters 2 and 3.
62. Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan, Scrutinizing Science, 13.
63. Laudan et al., “Scientific Change,” 158.
64. Ibid., 158–9.
65. Hull, “Testing Philosophical Claims About Science,” 471.
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data. As I have argued, this fits neither the conception of empirical inquiry
of philosophical naturalists nor our most compelling recent studies of em-
pirical inquiry in biology.
5.3 The separation of responsibility between history and philos-
ophy of science
The confrontation model can be taken to suggest a division of labor. Philoso-
phers provide theories to test, and historians provide the data by which
they are tested. The problem is that historians may not be delivering rele-
vant material for the philosophical project. We saw in Section 3 that Schick-
ore surveyed winners of the Pfizer Award and concluded that their topics
did not overlap with the interests of most professional philosophers of sci-
ence.
Although the Pfizer Prize is not representative of the entire field of the
history of science, it is probably true that current historical works rarely
speak directly to current philosophical problems, and vice versa. But the
chasm between the disciplines should not be exaggerated. Consider for in-
stance both the 2007 and 2014 Pfizer Prizes, to David Kaiser and Sachiko
Kusukawa, respectively, which were awarded for works on scientific vi-
suals. This is a topic that appears to be of rapidly increasing interest to
philosophers of science, who have started to think about the role of visu-
als in hypothesis generation, induction, explanation, and much more.66 It
is not at all hard to see how historical interests and philosophical concerns
might eventually connect.
Moreover, and following the theme of the present paper, the idea of
a division of labor is to some extent an artifact of mid-twentieth-century
philosophy of science. It closely mirrors the division of labor between the-
oreticians and experimentalists in physics, which philosophers of science
may have taken to be a typical feature of mature sciences. But this con-
ception does not generalize even within the sciences. It is not the norm in
biology for theoreticians and experimenters to form distinct communities
66. An admittedly biology-centered selection includes Benjamin Sheredos et al., “Why Do
Biologists Use So Many Diagrams?,” Philosophy of Science 80, no. 5 (2013): 931–944; Daniel
C. Burnston, “Data Graphs and Mechanistic Explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy
of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 57 (2016): 1–12; Raphael Scholl, “Spot the Difference:
Causal Contrasts in Scientific Diagrams,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences 60 (2016): 77–87.
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(with rare exceptions). In most biological laboratories, the invention of hy-
potheses, their empirical test, and the theoretical interpretation of results is
tightly integrated – indeed, often in the work of one person.
To be sure, this aspect of biological practice may one day change. But
there is nothing about empirical inquiry per se that demands a division of
labor between theoreticians and experimenters. Almost thirty years ago,
Laudan wrote that “philosophers of science cannot wait for, nor should
they expect, historians of science to do their work for them.”67 This still
seems exactly right.
5.4 The rationale for privileging history
In Section 3 we encountered Schickore’s worry that the confrontation model
cannot justify an essential role for history in the philosophy of science:
[I]f philosophy of science is recast as an empirical theory about
science, the privileging of historical information over other em-
pirical data appears utterly arbitrary.68
Her own argument for the indispensability of history to the philosophy of
science embraced historicism in the sense that “understanding a concept
or practice involves understanding how it came about.”69 A first goal of
this approach is to understand current methodological and epistemologi-
cal concepts and practices by understanding their history. This is related
to what James Lennox has called the “phylogenetic approach” to HPS.70
A second goal is to understand the concepts we use to analyze science by
understanding their history, as well.71 I am entirely sympathetic to this
67. Laudan, “Thoughts on HPS,” 13.
68. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 470.
69. Ibid., 455.
70. James G. Lennox, “History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Approach,”
História, Ciências, Saúde-Manguinhos 8, no. 3 (2001): 655–669.
71. But see also Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, “Historicism and the Failure of HPS,” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55 (2016): 3–11. Kuukkanen argued that historicism,
far from being the cement that holds history and philosophy of science together, may ex-
plain the failure of HPS. On his account, historians are mostly historicists who believe that
the objects of their research are impermanent, while philosophers tend to search for essen-
tial or permanent qualities of science. He suggested that this ontological tension between
historicism and essentialism precluded lasting integration. But I am skeptical about both
the explanans (does a majority of philosophers of science really search for essential quali-
ties?) and the explanandum (HPS has not failed).
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historicist argument. Understanding current states and concepts by under-
standing how they came about is a core motivation for practicing integrated
HPS. It is also entirely compatible with a naturalized philosophy of science,
since genetic understanding is a core aspect of many natural sciences as
well (consider astronomy, geology, or evolutionary biology).
However, Schickore exaggerated by arguing that, absent historicism,
the history of science is dispensable within a naturalized philosophy of
science. There are two leading arguments to that effect: First, that recent
science offers a superior empirical basis for a naturalized philosophy of sci-
ence; and second, that other empirical disciplines that study science offer
an alternative empirical basis. On close inspection, both arguments are un-
satisfactory.
The argument that recent science offers superior evidence is usually
traced to Giere’s “marriage of convenience” paper:
[S]urely we know (or can learn) more about the discovery of
DNA than of bacteria, and surely the study of recent develop-
ments in science requires no peculiarly historical techniques –
or at least not the techniques now taught by most historians of
science.72
Both of Giere’s main points are doubtful. First, the assumption that we
have richer epistemic access to recent than to past science is intuitive, but
it is an oversimplification. Our epistemic access depends on the ques-
tions we intend to study as well as the types of evidence we have at our
disposal. The authors of the VPI project clearly appreciated this point
in their methodological preliminaries.73 Sometimes the historical record is
very rich. Charles Darwin left copious and insightful records about his
reasoning not only in private notebooks but also in wide-ranging corre-
spondence. We often possess no comparable sources from more recent sci-
entists. To be sure, when studying contemporary science we have methods
at our disposal that we lack in the study of past science. These include
everything from the ethnographer’s participant observation to interviews,
surveys, and even experimental designs. But even when we are fortunate
enough to have obtained these types of data for precisely the right scientists
72. Giere, “Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?,” 290.
73. Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan, Scrutinizing Science, 8–14.
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at precisely the right time, they need not be superior to traditional histor-
ical sources. A carefully kept laboratory notebook, or a private exchange
of letters, may be more revealing of some aspects of scientific practice than
interviews, surveys, and even direct participation in laboratory activities.
It is false to assume that recent science invariably offers richer evidence.
There are some questions to which the study of contemporary science
gives us no access at all. For example, the VPI project asked questions about
the role of revolutions in scientific thought. Such revolutions were taken to
occur over decades and even centuries, and it is not at all clear how we
could learn about them from the study of recent science alone – unless we
designed and funded our studies for the seriously long run. Moreover, it
seems hasty to assume that all philosophically interesting scientific prac-
tices are best instantiated in recent science. It is likely that some practices
that are essential to the genesis of the existing corpus of scientific beliefs,
and that are therefore philosophically salient, are absent from or underrep-
resented in contemporary science. If the store of philosophically interesting
scientific practices is strictly cumulative, then such an intriguing finding
would be the result, not the starting assumption, of a metascientific project.
Giere’s second point was that the study of recent science does not rely
on the techniques typical of historical studies. Unfortunately, his examples
of past and recent science – the discovery of bacteria and of DNA – make
it difficult to assess the claim. Both are ambiguous, since we can place
the discovery of bacteria in the seventeenth century (when they were mi-
croscopically detected) or in the nineteenth (when they were named and
became a crucial focus of inquiry). Similarly, nucleic acids were discovered
in the nineteenth century, but the distinction between ribonucleic acid and
deoxyribonucleic acid occurred only in the twentieth. Whichever dates are
chosen, it is difficult to categorize either episode as “recent” from Giere’s
vantage point in 1973. Perhaps Giere was instead referring to Crick’s and
Watson’s discovery of the three-dimensional structure of DNA, published
in 1953. So let us stipulate generously that any science conducted in the
twenty-five years before the present falls on the recent side of the contin-
uum. I then still fail to see how its study does not rely precisely on the
main technique of the historian: the critical analysis of extant written and
material sources. The analysis of sources is essential, even when we are
studying recent episodes to which other methods (such as interviews with
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the scientific actors themselves) are also applicable.
The second argument, which Schickore emphasized, reflects the growth
of diversity in the study of science in the decades after Giere’s writings:
Within naturalized philosophy, historical study becomes just
one option among many other empirical approaches, such as
sociology, cultural studies, cognitive science, ethnography, an-
thropology, media studies, and so on.74
The claim here is not that recent science offers superior epistemic access to
scientific practice than past science, but that disciplines other than history
offer alternative empirical bases.
Interpreted in one, somewhat restricted sense, this conclusion seems
unobjectionable and even welcome. The history of science as a discipline
will only be one of many contributors to a naturalized metascientific project.
A more ambitious reading is that the past of science itself is dispensable as
the empirical basis of a metascientific project. But this would be a category
mistake. The shared empirical basis of all the naturalistic disciplines that
study science is constituted by science’s past up to the present moment.
Psychologists and sociologists are certainly interested in different aspects
of that empirical basis than historians or philosophers. If they are study-
ing the recent past of science and science in the making, they can also use
different methods in their studies. But we must not mistake a difference in
interests or methods for a difference in the object of study itself. Far from
offering an alternative empirical basis, these disciplines offer useful alter-
native concepts, questions and methods with which to approach the study
of science.
If this is right, then the history of science’s position as the “data” in the
history-philosophy relationship is secure. However, significant extensions
may be in store for philosophy’s role as the source of “theory.” Many of
the emerging frontiers in the philosophy of science will require the adop-
tion of concepts from other disciplines. For instance, it would be surprising
if no concepts from sociology were relevant to the study of scientific epis-
temology in collaborative or competitive settings; or if no concepts from
cognitive science were relevant to the study of the roles of scientific dia-
grams. This kind of opportunism and cross-fertilization is what the natu-
74. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 470.
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ralized perspective on the philosophy of science would have us expect. It
it commonplace in science to import models and methods from one area
to address issues in another. Consider that game theoretic models are use-
ful both in population genetics and in economics; that PCR machines serve
pathologists as well as paleogeneticists.
To sum up, we should ask the conceptual questions and use the em-
pirical methods that are most conducive to a comprehensive metascien-
tific project, regardless of their traditional disciplinary associations. But
even though concepts and methods may originate in any of the disciplines
that study science, they must all share the history of science (understood
broadly) as their empirical basis.
6 Conclusions
Traditional models of empirical inquiry are concerned with relating par-
ticular facts to general claims, where generality is understood in terms of
universally quantified statements. The “confrontation model” has adopted
these models to explicate the relationship between the history and the phi-
losophy of science. Unsurprisingly, it has therefore inherited the many dif-
ficulties of its inspirations. In Schickore’s words, the model “has led to a
number of unproductive debates about the nature and merits of HPS.”75
I could not agree more. The confrontation model provokes debates about
how many ravens must be black before we are warranted to assert that
all ravens are black – or rather, about how many biological explanations
must be mechanistic before we are warranted to assert that all biological
explanations are mechanistic. This way of framing the history-philosophy
relationship is unproductive.
Schickore diagnosed the problem to the very notion of analogizing the
methodology of HPS to the methodology of the empirical sciences. How-
ever, I have argued that the basic analogy to the empirical sciences is sound.
At the core of the confrontation model’s difficulties is its reliance on two
problematic models of inference: hypothetico-deductivism and enumera-
tive induction.
I have reframed the confrontation model based on recent accounts of
empirical inquiry in biology. On the reframed model, students of HPS
75. Schickore, “More Thoughts on HPS,” 465.
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engage in a process that involves three operations. First concrete exem-
plars are studied, then abstract descriptions are articulated, and finally the
scope of the abstract descriptions is explored by studying further concrete
instances. This process illuminates what we are doing when we are inves-
tigating the nature of induction, explanation, experimentation, or of any
other salient aspect of science. Importantly, our goal is not generality un-
derstood in terms of universally quantified statements. That is why the
traditional, vexatious models of inductive inference, which are focused on
the problem of ampliative inference, are inapplicable. Instead, the goal is
to know how broadly, and in what variations, certain abstract descriptions
apply to concrete instances.
Reframing the empirical methodology of HPS in this way, the two main
difficulties of the traditional confrontation model can be resolved or mit-
igated. First, the reframing dissolves the dilemma of case studies. The
dilemma asks how history and philosophy of science can be integrated ei-
ther bottom-up or top-down, since in the first case we will generalize with-
out warrant from particular historical cases, and in the second case we will
be liable to use cherry-picked historical cases to confirm preferred philo-
sophical intuitions. On the model of empirical inquiry outlined here, the
dilemma does not apply, since practitioners of HPS rarely try to leverage
individual historical cases in order to support general philosophical theses.
Second, the reframed confrontation model has the resources for deal-
ing with the problem of the theory-ladenness of historical data. I argued
that there is broad recognition of the problem and equally broad agreement
about the appropriate remedy. It is some sort of iterative procedure that al-
lows us to revise and adjust our conceptions in the course of inquiry. Itera-
tivity in this sense is a feature not only of Schickore’s hermeneutic method-
ology, but also of the traditional confrontation model and (even more em-
phatically) of my reframed version.
The recognition that the conceptual difficulties of the confrontation mod-
el have been exaggerated does not commit us to rejecting complementary
and even alternative approaches. For example, we can embrace Schickore’s
or Lennox’s historicism as a productive approach to integrated HPS even
as we also embrace the analogy to the natural sciences. Similarly, treating
parts of HPS as a science of science does not rule out that some questions
are best approached using tools from the hermeneutic tradition. It would
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be surprising indeed if a single approach were optimally suited to answer-
ing all philosophical questions about science.
To conclude, practicing HPS as a science of science is both attractive (be-
cause of the conceptual appeal of a naturalized philosophy of science) and
viable (because the objections to the confrontation model can be answered).
However, this is not to say that being a successful empirical science is the
discipline’s only goal. Far from it. History and philosophy of science is
also uniquely positioned to reflect broadly on the actual and desired role
of science in society. Such political and societal engagement is typical of
many sciences. The empirical and theoretical knowledge of physics and
economics contributes to a wide range of pressing debates, from climate
science to monetary policy. A robust metascience can and should play a
similar role. But to be useful in that role, it must first of all be a reliable
science of science.
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